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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. The appeal is from final orders and a final judgment of the
district court.

II.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the district court err in dismissing Appellants' (the "Hipwells") fraud

claims on the basis of this Court's language in the prior appeal in this case, Jensen v.
IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997) (attached as Appendix "A"), where the
sufficiency of the fraud claims was not before this Court in Jensen; Jensen specifically
confirmed the continued existence of Hipwells5 fraud claims; and Jensen held that the
Hipwells' fraud claims would be governed by a two year statute of limitations?
This issue was preserved below. [R. 2682-2690] This issue presents a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. State of Utah v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997).
2.

Did the district court err in refusing to allow the Hipwells leave to amend

their complaint to include language contained in this Court's opinion in Jensen that the
conduct of Dr. Healy could be imputed to IHC if Dr. Healy was acting as an agent or in
privity with IHC and if Dr. Healy acted at least in part to further the interests of IHC?
1

This issue was preserved below. [R. 2624-2647] This issue presents a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. Fisher v. Roberts, 125 F.3d 974, 977 (6th Cir. 1977);
City ofMonticello v. Christiansen, 788 P.2d 518 (Utah 1990).
3.

Did the district court err in refusing to permit evidence in the nature of an

admission by conduct that defendant Dr. Healy conspired with his attorney brother and
his co-counsel to conceal the medical negligence of Dr. Healy and IHC in the treatment
of Shelly Hipwell ("Shelly")? This issue was preserved below. [R. 3666-3677; R. 5008
at pp. 1229-1259; 5016 at pp. 1-18 and 24-26] This issue is reviewed on an abuse of
discretion standard. State of Utah v. Real Property at 633 East, etc., 942 P.2d 925, 930
(Utah 1997).
4.

Did the district court err in (a) refusing to allow the Hip wells' expert

medical witness, a physician specializing in high-risk obstetrics, to give an opinion that
the standard of care by Defendant IHC's emergency room was breached in its treatment
of Shelly, a high-risk obstetrical patient who presented at Defendant IHC's emergency
room with potentially life-threatening obstetrical symptoms and signs but was sent home
with Tylenol; and (b) dismissing the Hipwells' allegations of negligence against
Defendant IHC insofar as Shelly's emergency room treatment was concerned, and in
instructing the jury that Defendant IHC's emergency room was not negligent? This issue
2

was preserved below. [R. 5004 at pp. 395-402, 457-459; R. 5011 at pp. 1789-1815; R.
5014 at pp. 2348-2349] This issue is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard.
Steffensen v. Smith }s Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). However,
to the extent the district court applied the wrong legal standard, this Court reviews for
correctness. Chandler v. Blue Cross, 833 P.2 356, 360 (Utah 1992).

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The Hipwells alleged that doctors and lawyers conspired to conceal medical

negligence and to deprive Shelly Hipwell, a brain damaged patient, of legal
compensation for her catastrophic injuries.
The Hipwells, who are Shelly's heirs, seek recovery in this action for the
malpractice and fraud committed by Defendants/Appellees, Michael J. Healy, M.D.
("Dr. Healy") and McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee"), owned by Intermountain
Health Care Corporation ("IHC") (collectively "Defendants"), in connection with their
pregnancy-related treatment of Shelly in December of 1988.

3

The Defendants' fraudulent conduct is at the heart of the Hipwells' case. The
Defendants' negligence caused Shelly to become critically ill. In an attempt to conceal
that negligence, the Defendants transferred Shelly to the University of Utah Hospital
("University Hospital") on the basis of a condition that did not exist.

In January, 1989,

at the University Hospital, Shelly's heart was negligently punctured during a sternal bone
marrow biopsy. This event, given Shelly's critically ill condition, resulted in severe
anoxic brain damage and Shelly's ultimate death.
Dr. Healy knew that he was a potential defendant in Shelly's medical negligence
case. Two days after Shelly's heart puncture at the University Hospital, Dr. Healy met
with his attorney brother and discussed the case. With the help of the Healys' sister,
Diane DeVries ("DeVries") (the Relief Society President for the Hipwells' L.D.S. ward
and an employee of Dr. Healy), Attorney Healy was secretly associated on Shelly's case
without the knowledge of the Hip well family. Approximately four months after Shelly's
heart puncture, her medical negligence case against the University Hospital was settled
by Attorney Healy in a manner that purported to release all health care providers. This
settlement occurred without litigation and with no real investigation into Dr. Healy's or
IHC's conduct. The case was settled for $250,000.00, the amount of a prior statutory
cap on damages against the University Hospital which had been removed by this Court
4

several weeks before the Hipwell settlement occurred. In the present case, Dr. Healy and
IHC have jointly claimed the protection of the release obtained by Attorney Healy in the
settlement with the University Hospital.
The Hipwells initially sued Attorney Healy and his co-counsel, Roger Sharp
("Sharp"), for malpractice. (See Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993).) In the
course of the investigation regarding that claim, the negligence of Dr. Healy and IHC
was revealed. In 1992, the Hipwells filed suit against the Defendants. [R.l]
In 1995, the district court dismissed all of the Hipwells' claims on statute of
limitations grounds. [R. 1344-1347]
In 1997, this Court in Jensen reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded
for trial with the guidance that Hipwells' fraud/fraudulent concealment claims would be
governed by a two year statute of limitations. [R. 1426-1455]
In October, 1999, a jury trial limited to the statute of limitations issue was held.
The Hipwells objected to this bifurcation as well as the district court's ruling which
precluded any evidence of Attorney Healy's involvement in covering up his brother's
negligence. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict in the Hipwells' favor. [R. 2423]
Thereafter, Dr. Healy and IHC filed a joint "Motion to Confirm Dismissal of
Plaintiffs' Fraud Claim." [R. 2668-2677] By Memorandum Decision dated May 19,
5

2000, and an Order dated June 5, 2000, the district court again dismissed the Hip wells'
fraud claims, this time ruling that this Court's decision in Jensen had done so even
though this Court had remanded the fraud claims for trial on the merits.[R. 2750-2758]
The district court also denied the Hipwells' motion to amend their complaint to
allege that Dr. Healy acted as IHC's agent or was in privity with IHC and acted at least
in part to further IHC's interest so that IHC was liable for Dr. Healy's fraudulent conduct
because the district court dismissed the fraud claim. [R. 2750-2758]
The Hipwells timely filed a petition to this Court for an interlocutory appeal
which was denied on August 25, 2000.

[R. 2993] The district court's dismissal of the

Hipwells' fraud claims left only their medical negligence claims against the Defendants
for trial.
On March 21, 2001, the district court issued rulings on two pretrial motions as
follows:
A.

That evidence of Dr. Healy's conduct with his attorney brother

amounting to an obstruction of justice would be admissible as an admission by
conduct despite the dismissal of Hipwells' fraud claims [R. 4568]; and
B.

That the Hipwells' obstetrical medical expert, Dr. Greggory Devore,

could give an opinion that the standard of care had been breached by IHC's
6

emergency room in the treatment of Shelly's obstetrical symptoms. [R. 45684569; R. 5016 at pp. 24-26]
On March 27, 2001, trial commenced. In opening statement, the Hipwells
advised the jury that medical negligence had occurred at McKay-Dee Hospital beginning
with Shelly's treatment at the Emergency Room there and that attempts were
subsequently made to conceal that medical negligence. [R 5003 pp. 197-198; 204-208]
The Hipwells specifically advised the jury regarding the Healy brothers' conduct
involving concealment, namely the steps taken to have Attorney Healy become Shelly's
lawyer and the subsequent quick settlement of Shelly's case without any investigation
into Dr. Healy. [IdL at pp. 223-225]
Subsequently, during the presentation of the Hipwells' case, the district court
reversed both its pre-trial rulings. The district court refused to allow the Hipwells to
present any evidence of the Healy brothers' obstruction of justice and also refused to
allow Dr. Devore to give My opinion regarding a breach of the standard of care by
IHC's emergency room in the treatment of Shelly. [R. 5008 at pp. 1226-1259; R. 5004
at pp. 398-402; 415;420-421; R. 5016 at pp. 1-18]
At the conclusion of the Hipwells' case, the district court granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss that portion of the Hipwells' medical negligence claims relating to the
7

IHC emergency room. The district court instructed the jury, over the Hipwells'
objection, that the IHC emergency room was not negligent in its treatment of Shelly. [R.
5011 at pp. 1814-1815; 4904] The Hipwells properly objected to this instruction. [R.
5014 at pp. 2348-2349]
On April 15, 2001, the jury returned a verdict for the Defendants, finding that
they were not negligent in their treatment of Shelly. [R. 4930] Judgment was entered on
that verdict on April 24, 2001. [R. 4939]
The Hipwells filed their Notice of Appeal on May 23, 2001. [R. 4966]
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The Emergency Room Malpractice
1.

In December, 1988, Shelly was 26 years old and was in the third trimester

of her pregnancy with her second child. Dr. Healy was her obstetrician. [R. 5006 at p.
915 and Ex. 1 pp. 000002]
2.

Shortly before 6:00 a.m. on the morning of December 12, 1988, Shelly

presented herself at the emergency room of McKay-Dee complaining of severe pains
under her ribs that she had been experiencing since midnight. [R. 5004 at pp. 403-404;
5009 at pp. 1540-1541]. Dr. Healy's records with respect to Shelly had previously been
delivered to McKay-Dee. [R. 5004 at pp. 380 and 388.] These records gave base
8

readings on Shelly's platlets, blood pressure and protein in the urine. [Id. at 389-390]
The records were available to the emergency room. [R. 5006 at p. 921]
3.

Shelly was treated by Dr. King in the emergency room. According to the

Hipwells' expert, Dr. Greggory Devore ("Dr. Devore"), tests conducted by the
emergency room staff showed that Shelly had an abnormal elevation of blood pressure,
an almost thirty percent drop in blood platlets, and abnormal (one plus) protein in the
urine. [R. 5004 at pp. 329-331 and 407-411] This was the first time she had more than
trace protein in her urine. [R. 5008 at p. 931] Dr. King also noted that Shelly had
epigastric pain. [R. 5004 at pp. 407-411]
4.

Pre-eclampsia is a disease which affects only pregnant woman. The usual

diagnostic criteria for pre-eclampsia are elevated blood pressure and protein in the urine.
[Id. at pp. 320-321] If a patient has pre-eclampsia, a physician is on heightened alert for
severe pre-eclampsia and HELLP syndrome. If epigastric pain is also present, preeclampsia is considered severe. HELLP syndrome is a variant form of severe preeclampsia. The target organ of HELLP syndrome is the liver. Epigastric pain is a
common symptom of liver damage and internal bleeding within, or on the surface of, the
liver. The liver can rupture as a result of the damage caused by HELLP syndrome.
Liver damage can be confirmed by doing a blood test to see if liver enzymes are
9

elevated. Severe pre-eclampsia and HELLP syndrome can cause death or serious
permanent injury to the mother. The only treatment for severe pre-eclampsia/HELLP
syndrome is immediate delivery of the baby. [Id. at pp. 321, 331-339 and 348-351]
5.

Intrauterine Growth Retardation ("IUGR") means that the fetus is smaller

than normal. [R. 5004 at p. 313] IUGR patients are more susceptible to develop HELLP
syndrome. [R. 5006 at p. 919] During Shelly's pregnancy, Dr. Healy categorized Shelly
as a high risk obstetrical patient because of IUGR and asked for consultations by high
risk maternal fetal medicine specialists at IHC, Dr. Devore and Dr. Stephen Clark. [Id. at
p. 918] Dr. Devore was, at the time, the head of the maternal fetal medicine department
at IHC. [R. 5004 at pp. 276-278; 281-282]
6.

The IHC emergency room did not conduct a liver function test to

determine if Shelly had suffered liver damage. [R. 5009 at p. 1425] No liver function test
was performed until December 14, a day after delivery. [R. 5004 at pp. 438-442]
Instead, Shelly was sent home from the emergency room with Tylenol and the
emergency room physician made note to follow-up with Dr. Healy ("f/u Dr. Healy"). [Id.
at pp. 405-406] Dr. Healy denied that he was informed of the emergency room visit. [R.
5006 at pp. 925 and 935] Dr. Healy admitted that if the diagnosis of HELLP syndrome

10

had been made on December 12, he probably would have delivered the baby that day. [R.
5006 at p. 920]
7.

Dr. Devore was consulted on December 13 and immediately sent Shelly to

labor and delivery. Shelly was in labor and delivery within approximately ten minutes of
when Dr. Devore saw her. [R. 5004 at pp. 430-434] Shelly delivered by emergency
cesarean section performed by Dr. Healy in the evening of December 13, 1988. [Id. at
pp. 447-448] Dr. Devore opined that given the information from the emergency room
tests, the baby should have been delivered at the time of the emergency room visit on
December 12 or that morning because her symptoms were hallmarks for severe preeclampsia. [Id. at pp. 422-423 and 442] Shelly was suffering from HELLP syndrome
prior to the time she gave birth. [Id. at p. 444] Dr. Devore testified that the failure to
deliver the baby on the morning of December 12 was below the standard of care. [Id. at
p. 445] Dr. Devore further testified that the severe complications Shelly suffered could
have been avoided had she been delivered timely. [Id. at pp. 446-447]
8.

Shelly had elevated blood pressure, low platlets, and spontaneous bleeding

under the skin following delivery. [Id. at pp. 464-467] At approximately 10:30 a.m. on
the following morning, December 14, 1988, Shelly had a hypotensive crisis involving
plummeting blood pressure, rapid heart rate (tachycardia), and other physical signs and
11

symptoms indicating that she was in shock due to loss of blood. At approximately 11:00
a.m. on December 14, 1988, Shelly was admitted to the McKay-Dee intensive care unit
("ICU"). [Id. at p. 467-474] Her care was co-managed in the ICU by Dr. Baughman, the
director of the ICU (an IHC employee) and Dr. Healy. [R. 5006 at p. 935; R. 5011 at pp.
1889-1890] Dr. Baughman diagnosed Shelly as suffering from HELLP syndrome and
being in shock due to internal bleeding. [Id. at pp. 1842, 1917-1923; R. 5004 at pp. 480483] Shelly's abdomen was distended upon arrival at the ICU and continued to become
more distended during the next seven hours there. [R. 5011 at p. 1915] Dr. Baughman
recognized that internal bleeding was a likely cause of this distention. [Id. at pp. 1926]
While in the ICU from 11:00 a.m. to approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 14, 1988, no
objective tests such as a CT Scan or ultrasound were conducted by Dr. Baughman or Dr.
Healy to determine the source of Shelly's internal bleeding. [R. 5008 at pp. 1196-1197]
9.

At approximately 5:30 p.m. on December 14, 1988, Dr. Baughman and Dr.

Healy requested (for the first time that day) a surgical consultation by Dr. Alder. [R.
5012 at pp. 2156-2158; R. 5005 at pp. 551-552] Upon examination, Dr. Alder
immediately ordered Shelly to surgery. Dr. Alder's pre-operative diagnosis was that
Shelly likely had a ruptured liver. At surgery, it was determined that Shelly's liver had

12

ruptured and that she had lost approximately 60 percent of her blood volume into her
distended abdomen. [R. 5008 at pp. 1264-1267; 1275-1276; R. 5005 at pp. 554-556]
10.

Following surgery, and as a result of Shelly's prolonged internal bleeding

during her course in the ICU, she became critically ill, developing Adult Respiratory
Distress Syndrome ("ARDS") and sepsis. [R. 5005 at pp. 557-561; 570-571; R. 5008 at
pp. 1209-1210]
11.

There was a concern by Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman that Shelly's

abdominal caesarean section wound may have been developing a potentially lethal
bacterial condition known as necrotizing fasciitis. The appropriate treatment for this
condition was surgical removal of the tissue in the area of concern and antibiotics. [R.
5009 at p. 1471; R. 5008 at pp. 1216-1223]
12.

On December 21, 1988, Dr. Alder conducted a surgical debridement of

tissue in the area of Shelly's abdominal wound and she was followed with antibiotics.
Dr. Alder did not believe that Shelly had necrotizing fasciitis. As Shelly's treating
surgeon, he so advised Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman. The McKay-Dee pathology report
on the tissue removed by Dr. Alder indicated that Shelly did not have the lethal form of
necrotizing fasciitis about which Dr. Baughman was allegedly concerned. Dr. Alder's
follow-up examinations on December 22, and December 23, 1988, revealed that Shelly's
13

abdominal wound was "healthy-appearing" and was improving. [R. 5008 at pp. 12801291; R. 5005 at pp. 586-593 and 597-598]
The Fraud/Fraudulent Concealment Claims
13.

Dr. Baughman and Dr. Healy believed that Shelly was probably going to

die because of her critically ill state. [R. 5008 at pp. 1216-1222; R. 5012 at pp. 21432144]
14.

The McKay-Dee ICU was capable of treating Shelly's critical illness. [R.

5011 at pp. 1889-1890] Nevertheless, on December 23, 1988, Dr. Healy and Dr.
Baughman had Shelly transferred, via helicopter, in a critically ill state and on a
ventilator, to the University Hospital in Salt Lake City. [R. 5008 at pp. 1221-1222] The
only reason set forth in Shelly's medical chart for this transfer was Dr. Healy's and Dr.
Baughman's alleged concern that Shelly had necrotizing fasciitis. [R. 5011 at pp. 18891890] Dr. Healy admitted at trial that he thought Shelly was going to die and that was
part of the reason he transferred her. [R. 5008 at pp. 1218-1219] The Hipwell family
was not consulted, nor did they give their consent to this transfer. [R. 5010 at pp. 17361738]
15.

Upon arrival at the University Hospital, it did not appear that Shelly had

necrotizing fasciitis, and she never developed necrotizing fasciitis at the University
14

Hospital. [R. 5008 at p. 1220; R. 5005 at p. 608] Nevertheless, no attempts were made
to return Shelly to the IHC system by Dr. Baughman or Dr. Healy. [R. 5008 at pp. 12201221]
16.

Several weeks after her arrival at the University Hospital, in the course of a

sternal bone marrow biopsy performed by a resident, the biopsy needle penetrated
through Shelly's sternum and into her heart, causing a laceration of the heart. This heart
puncture, superimposed upon Shelly's already critically ill condition, caused her to suffer
severe anoxic brain injury. Shelly would not have suffered the brain injury but for the
critical condition she was in from her treatment at McKay-Dee. [R. 5007 at pp. 987-989;
1017-1020]
17.

Dr. Healy recognized that he was a potential defendant in Shelly's medical

negligence claim against the University Hospital. [R. 3776] Two days after Shelly's
heart was punctured at the University Hospital, Dr. Healy met with his brother, Attorney
Tim Healy ("Attorney Healy") and discussed Shelly's medical negligence case. Dr.
Healy told Attorney Healy that "Some attorney is really going to clean up on this one."
[R. 846-863; 3670-3671; 3772-3786]
18.

Thereafter, Attorney Healy discussed the matter with the Healys' sister,

DeVries. DeVries was the Mormon Church Relief Society President for the Hip wells'
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L.D.S. ward and knew the Hipwell family through her church work. DeVries was also at
the time an employee of Dr. Healy. DeVries contacted the Hipwells and urged them to
see Sharp in Salt Lake City. DeVries did not tell the Hipwells that she was Dr. Healy's
sister. [R. 846 and 3670]
19.

The Hipwells met with and retained Sharp. Subsequently, and without the

knowledge of the Hipwell family, Sharp associated Attorney Healy on the case, agreeing
to give him forty percent of the fee for little or no work. [R. 846-847 and 3670]
20.

In a letter dated February 13, 1989, Attorney Healy wrote to Sharp:
Dear Rog:
It is my understanding from our telephone
conversation last Thursday or Friday, that you are in the
process of obtaining the medical records on Shellie Hipwell
from the counsel for the University of Utah Medical Center.
I have alerted my brother to the fact that you may be
requesting copies of his medical records which is a routine
procedure at this point. I have advised him that Shellie's
family had not expressed any concern or dissatisfaction over
his treatment. I would appreciate receiving copies, Rog, of
the various correspondence and requests for medical
records, reports, etc., in this case in order that I may
maintain an up-to-date file.
I am sure that we are both pleased that with some
extensive follow up efforts, we were able to get the husband
and mother of Shellie Hipwell into see you and sign a
retainer agreement for handling the case. I believe that an
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appropriate fee-sharing arrangement in this case would be a
40% - 60% split, with 40%o of the legal fee coming to me and
60% to yourself I think that we both understand that the
case was generated by my brother's indepth discussion of the
case with me and his desire that the case be handled by
someone who would provide good, competent representation
in Shellie 's behalf
Thereafter, as you know, I spoke with my sister,
Diane, who lives in the same ward as Shellie Hipwell, and
who is the Relief Society President. She shared our concern
and did make contact with the family, initially with the
mother and subsequently with her husband. She, of course,
emphasized the need for Shellie to have the best possible
counsel, provided them with your name and telephone
number and confirmed their desire to schedule an
appointment ASAP.
According to the discussions which I had with my
brother, this case should be a very substantial one which
should result in a sizeable settlement. He has also indicated,
that in his opinion, the malpractice was very clear and
should not involve the need for litigation. I assume that the
proposed aforesaid fee-sharing arrangement is satisfactory.
If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.
[R. 847-848]
21.

By the date of this letter, Dr. Healy was aware that his brother was

associated as an attorney on Shelly's medical negligence case. After being associated as
co-counsel on Shelly's case, Attorney Healy began communicating privileged
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information to Dr. Healy, specifically that the Hipwell family did not suspect Dr. Healy
of medical negligence in his care of Shelly. [R. 849 and 3671]
22.

Documents prepared by Dr. Healy, which linked his care of Shelly with her

subsequent brain injury, were not provided to Sharp or Attorney Healy by Dr. Healy.
Furthermore, Sharp and Attorney Healy did not obtain a complete set of medical records
from McKay-Dee. [R. 850-852 and 3671]
23.

On May 1, 1989, in Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348

(Utah 1989) this Court abolished the $250,000 cap on damages against the University
Hospital. At about the time the Condemarin decision came down, Dr. Healy had
discussions with Attorney Healy regarding the settlement of Shelly5 s medical negligence
case. Attorney Healy told Dr. Healy that if Shelly was likely to die in the near future her
case should be settled as soon as possible. [R. 853-854 and 3671]
24.

At the time of these discussions, Shelly had been returned to the McKay-

Dee Rehabilitation Facility and Dr. Healy was not involved in Shelly's care there. At the
request of his attorney brother, Dr. Healy visited Shelly at the McKay-Dee Rehabilitation
Facility. [R. 3671]
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25.

Dr. Healy reported back to attorney Healy that Shelly's life expectancy was

short. Dr. Healy was aware that the cost of Shelly's future care given her brain injured
condition would be approximately $5,000,000. [R. 853-854 and 3671]
26.

Without mentioning Dr. Healy's name, Sharp advised the Hipwell family

that he had discussed Shelly's case with several doctors and their opinion was that Shelly
would die in the very near future. On the basis of this, Sharp urged the Hipwell family to
settle Shelly's claims against the University of Utah for $250,000, notwithstanding the
removal of the cap in that amount by the Condemarin case. [R. 854-857 and 3671]
27.

After the Hipwell family agreed to settle the case for this amount, Sharp

introduced Attorney Healy as his assistant for purposes of obtaining court approval of
the settlement. The Hipwell family was never told that Attorney Healy was associated as
co-counsel on Shelly's medical negligence case. [R. 811 and 815-816]
28.

On the advice of attorneys Healy and Sharp, the Hipwell family signed a

release which purported to release not only the University Hospital, but all other health
care providers involved in Shelly's care. In the present lawsuit, Dr. Healy and IHC
jointly (but unsuccessfully) claimed the protection of this release. [R. 44-45 and 54]
29.

Shelly's case was settled in late May, 1989, a little over four months after

her heart puncture at the University Hospital, for $250,000. [R. 857-858]
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30.

Subsequently, the Hipwell family learned that Shelly was likely to live a

reasonably normal life expectancy and retained counsel to investigate Shelly's
representation by Sharp. In the course of that investigation, the connection between
Sharp, Attorney Healy and Dr. Healy was revealed. [R. 1249-1254]
Dr. Devore's Testimony Concerning the Emergency Room Malpractice
31.

Dr. Devore is a physician practicing in Pasadena, California, and also in

Detroit, Michigan. He graduated from the University of Utah Medical School in 1975.
He served his internship in internal medicine at Yale University. He served his residency
training in obstetrics and gynecology at Yale University, which he completed in 1979.
He then became an obstetrician and gynecologist and an obstetric surgeon. Following
completion of his residency, he trained for two additional years in the sub-speciality of
maternal fetal medicine which is the study of pregnancy complications involving women
and their fetus or unborn child. Following that training, he practiced as a specialist in
high risk obstetrics. [R. 5004 at pp. 276-279]
32.

Dr. Devore then became a professor at the University of Southern

California, which, at the time, was housed at the Los Angeles County Women's Hospital
which was the largest hospital in the United States in terms of numbers of babies
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delivered. He was involved in the supervision of labor and delivery. He also was
responsible for training residents in maternal fetal medicine. [Id. at pp. 279-280]
33.

In 1987, he joined IHC as Corporate Director of Maternal Fetal Medicine

for high risk obstetrics responsible for supervising the obstetrical operations of IHC. The
concept was to have a "vertically integrated" program where he would be involved in the
care of high risk obstetric patients throughout the IHC hospital system and in teaching
IHC physicians how to care for high risk patients. [Id. at 281]
34.

Dr. Devore is board certified in obstetrics and gynecology and in maternal

fetal medicine. [Id. at p. 280] Dr. Devore regularly teaches in the areas of high risk
obstetrics around the country. [Id. at p. 288-289]
35.

When Dr. Devore began his training in internal medicine at Yale

University, one of his responsibilities was to work in the emergency room. He spent
numerous hours working in the emergency room evaluating patients, triaging patients,
sending them to be admitted to the hospital or seeking surgical consultations, or in some
cases, obstetrical consultations. When he moved to obstetrics and gynecology he
covered the emergency room as well. During his three years as a resident, he covered the
emergency room hundreds of times. He had "huge experience" in the emergency room
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evaluating obstetrical patients and adult patients. He also observed other emergency
rooms physicians taking in patients and referring out patients. [Id. at pp. 292-293]
36.

During the time Dr. Devore was at the University of Southern California,

from 1981 through 1987, he was also involved in seeing and evaluating patients in the
emergency room. During that same period of time, he had a private practice in several
hospitals in the Los Angeles area and would see patients coming through the emergency
room and was actively involved in the emergency room through 1987 prior to moving to
Utah. [Id. at 293-294]
37.

Dr. Devore similarly had experience with surgical emergencies and

training for such emergencies, including emergency room experience. [Id. at pp. 299301]
38.

After joining IHC in 1987, Dr. Devore had occasion to observe the manner

in which obstetric patients were processed through the emergency room department.
Patients that would come to the emergency room would be evaluated in the emergency
room by the resident or the emergency room physician who would then call the
obstetrical resident or the private obstetrician and Dr. Devore would get involved as the
case evolved. It was a common practice for a patient coming to the emergency room at
LDS Hospital to be seen by the emergency room physician and then immediately
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evaluated by an obstetrician or a resident obstetrician. Occasionally, Dr. Devore would
go down to the emergency room to see the patient. Moreover, Dr. Devore visited
hospitals in the IHC system to teach IHC physicians the standard of care when a third
trimester obstetric patient with Shelly's symptoms presented to the emergency room and
was involved in a training program for IHC to teach family practitioners in rural
hospitals with respect to obstetrical care and that involved emergency room situations.
[Id. at p. 295 and 416-441]
39.

During the time he was with IHC, he was familiar with its accepted custom

and practice with regard to how obstetric patients would be dealt with if they entered the
system through the emergency room. Because emergency room physicians are not
obstetricians or gynecologists when a pregnant woman came to the emergency room
having a complaint, there was to be an obstetrical evaluation to determine the effect of
the pregnancy on her condition. The quarterback on all issues involving a pregnancy
was to be the obstetrician. [Id. at pp. 295-297] In fact, in his experience at Yale
University, as well as the hospitals in Los Angeles, the emergency room physicians did
not take upon themselves responsibilities of an obstetrician when they were evaluating
an obstetrician patient in the emergency room. An obstetrician/gynecologist was
suppose to be called in to see the patient. [Id. at pp. 297-298]
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40.

Dr. Devore had substantial experience with respect to the standard of care

for an emergency room physician with an obstetric patient in the third trimester with the
information that was gathered concerning Shelly where she had a dramatic drop in her
platelet counts, abnormal blood pressure, protein in her urine and epigastric pain
indicating possible severe pre-eclampsia. [Id. at pp. 407-414] The hospitals at which he
obtained this knowledge included Yale New Haven Hospital, Los Angeles Woman's
Hospital, and Cedars-Sinai Hospital. [Id. at pp. 415-416]
41.

Dr. Devore testified that in all his experience there was a uniform standard

of care on what was done when an obstetric patient presented to an emergency room
with the information such as gathered on Shelly's condition. [Id. at pp. 420-421] Dr.
Devore testified that when an obstetrical patient comes into the emergency room in the
third trimester, and information is obtained such as in Shelly's case, the emergency room
physician should contact the obstetrician and give the information to the obstetrician.
However, the district court struck this answer on the basis of foundation [Id. at p. 415]
Dr. Devore was not permitted to testify that the McKay-Dee emergency room breached
the standard of care in its treatment of Shelly. [Id. at pp. 398-402, 457-459 and 420-421]
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Marshaling the Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict
That Dr. Healv and IHC Were Not Negligent
The jury rendered its special verdict determining that Dr. Healy and IHC were not
negligent in their treatment of Shelly. The Hipwells concede that Dr. Healy and IHC
presented sufficient evidence - - principally the testimony of their experts, Dr. James
Martin and Dr. Joseph Civetta - - to support this verdict. The Hipwells are not
contending on this appeal that the judgment should be reversed because the jury could
not have reasonably concluded as it did based on the evidence actually presented to the
jury. Instead, the Hipwells argue that the special verdict should be overturned because
the evidence the district court excluded concerning Dr. Healy's conduct in covering up
the malpractice and Dr. Devore's opinion on the negligence in the emergency room
deprived the jury of having all of the relevant evidence in deciding the negligence issues.
If this evidence had not been erroneously excluded, the jury may well have rendered a
verdict in favor of the Hipwells. However, the Hipwells will nevertheless summarize the
evidence presented by Defendants supporting the jury's verdict.
The Defendants' experts testified that as set forth in paragraphs a through g
below:
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a.

It is rare for patients with HELLP syndrome to develop bleeding into the

liver. Dr. Martin's best estimate was that bleeding occurs only in 1 in 45,000 to 1 in
225,000 births. [R. 5009 at pp. 1364-1365] In 1988, the only treatment for HELLP
syndrome was delivery of the baby and supportive medical care. [Id. at p. 1361]
b.

When Shelly was tested in the emergency room, her EKG, blood count and

blood pressure were normal. There was a trace of protein in her urine. [Id. at pp. 13761379] The emergency room records did not show an opinion of epigastric pain, but a
description of epigastric pain would not have made much difference given the other
testing. [Id. at pp. 1376-1337 and 1428-1429] If Dr. Healy had been advised of the
information contained in the emergency room record, he would not have been required to
do anything different with respect to the timing of Shelly's delivery. [R. 5009 at p. 1379]
c.

Dr. Healy delivered the baby in a timely way. [Id. at p. 1380-1381] Once

the delivery was completed, there was nothing Dr. Healy could have done that would
have changed Shelly's outcome. [Id. at p. 1381]
d.

When Dr. Healy was told about Shelly's bleeding at 10:45 a.m. on

December 14, 1988, he immediately transferred Shelly into the ICU. [Id. at pp. 13861387] Dr. Baughman managed Shelly's care in the ICU appropriately. [R. 5010 at p.
1564] Shelly did not have significant bleeding from the time she was in the ICU until
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approximately 17:00 on December 14. Shelly did not have a ruptured liver until that
point. [R. 5009 at pp. 1388-1389; R. 5010 at pp. 1565-1566] There is no indication from
the time Shelly was admitted to the ICU until about 17:00 that she should be taken to
surgery. [R. 5009 at p. 1391; R. 5010 at p. 1565] The liver rupture was diagnosed timely
and the surgery was done as fast as it could be done. [R. 5009 at 1394; R. 5010 at p.
1564] There was nothing that Dr. Healy or Dr. Baughman could have done to prevent
Shelly's liver rupture or complications she suffered while at McKay-Dee. [R. 5009 at p.
1396; R. 5010 atp. 1580]
e.

Necrotizing fasciitis is very rare but is very rapid in progression and if it is

not anticipated the mother can die. [R. 5009 at p. 1396] Shelly was at a greater risk for
this problem. [Id. at p. 1397] It was reasonable for Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman to be
concerned about necrotizing fasciitis. [Id. at pp. 1400-1401] It was perfectly appropriate
to decide to transfer Shelly to the University Hospital. [Id. at pp. 1402-1403]
f.

The cause of Shelly5 s brain injury was lack of blood flow to the brain

caused by the puncture of her heart at the University Hospital. There were no
contributing factors. [R. 5013 at pp. 2285-2289]
g.

Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman complied with the standard of care in their

treatment of Shelly. [R. 5009 atp. 1403; R. 5010 at pp. 1563-1565]
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IV.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court erred in dismissing the Hip wells' fraud claims on the basis of
this Court's prior ruling in Jensen. This Court did not dismiss the fraud claims in
Jensen. The Court instead determined that the two year Medical Malpractice Act
statute of limitations applied to those claims and remanded the fraud claims to the
district court for further proceedings.

B.

The district court erred in denying leave to amend the Hip wells' fraud claims to
allege that a privity or agency relationship existed between Dr. Healy and IHC
and Dr. Healy was acting to further the interests of IHC. The sole basis for the
denial was the district court's erroneous conclusion that this Court in Jensen
dismissed the fraud claims. The Hipwells timely sought leave to amend in
accordance with the scheduling order and Defendants did not argue or
demonstrate any prejudice if leave to amend were to be granted.

C.

The district court erred in refusing to permit evidence that Dr. Healy and his
attorney brother fraudulently concealed the medical negligence of Dr. Healy and
IHC. Evidence of the statements and conduct of Dr. Healy and the other
conspirators to conceal the malpractice was admissible as an admission by
conduct. That evidence was not only highly relevant to whether Dr. Healy
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believed he had committed malpractice, but could have had a substantial impact
on Dr. Healy's credibility with the jury. The jury may have concluded that Dr.
Healy had information concerning the emergency room visit and should have
delivered Shelly early in the morning of December 12. Exclusion of evidence
under Rule 403 on the ground of prejudice is an extraordinary remedy that should
be used sparingly. The evidence would not have unfairly prejudiced Defendants
nor would any prejudice have substantially outweighed its probative value.
D.

The district court erred in refusing to allow the Hip wells' medical expert, Dr.
Devore, to give an opinion regarding breach of the standard of care by IHC's
emergency room. Dr. Devore was fully qualified to testify concerning the
standard of care in the emergency room. Dr. Devore was knowledgeable
concerning that standard of care by virtue of his years of experience and position
as head of the Maternal Fetal Medicine Department at IHC at the time of Shelly's
injuries. Moreover, the standard of care required that the emergency room
physician refer Shelly to an obstetrician for treatment and Dr. Devore was
knowledgeable concerning the standard of care for treatment by an obstetrician.
Further, once the emergency room physician elected to treat Shelly he was subject
to the standard of care applicable to an obstetrician. The district court erred in
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dismissing the emergency room malpractice claim because of the exclusion of Dr.
Devore's testimony and instructing the jury that the emergency room had not been
negligence. This error also requires that the special verdict be set aside as to the
other malpractice claims because the jury could well have determined that the
other alleged acts of malpractice were less egregious than the emergency room
malpractice and if the care in the emergency room did not breach the standard of
care neither did the other acts. Also, the district court exclusion's of this evidence
after the Hipwells' counsel referred to it in opening statement could have had a
substantial impact on counsel's credibility with the jury.

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE HIPWELLS9
FRAUD CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF THIS COURT'S PRIOR RULING
IN JENSEN.
The Hipwells alleged in this action a conspiracy to fraudulently conceal Shelly's

causes of action against the Defendants. As part of this conspiracy, Dr. Healy had Shelly
transferred to the University Hospital on a pretext. After Shelly's heart was punctured,
Dr. Healy and Attorney Healy had their sister, DeVries, who was the Relief Society
President in Sherry Jensen's ward, solicit Mrs. Jensen to retain Sharp to represent Shelly
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without disclosing DeVries relationship to Dr. Healy. Attorney Healy was then secretly
associated as co-counsel with Sharp with an agreement that he would receive forty
percent of the fee in return for little, if any, work. Attorney Healy and Sharp, with the
assistance of Dr. Healy (who knew he was a potential defendant), then orchestrated a
quick settlement of the case against the University Hospital without any lawsuit being
filed or discovery being conducted and without any real investigation of Shelly's care by
Dr. Healy and IHC. The Hipwells sought recovery for fraud and fraudulent concealment
against Dr. Healy and for constructive fraud against all Defendants. [R. 277-298] The
evidence adduced during discovery amply supported these allegations. [See, Statement of
Facts ("SOF") Nos. 13-30]
In 1995, Healy and IHC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The sole basis of
the motion was that all of the Hipwells' claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
[R. 1270-1326]
The district court erroneously granted summary judgment dismissing all of the
Hipwells' claims solely on the basis that they were barred by the statute of limitations.
However, the district court recognized that absent the bar of the statute of limitations,
the fraudulent concealment claims presented issues of fact for determination by a jury,
stating:
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The fraud claims are also barred; however, if they were not
barred [by the statute of limitations] the existence of material
facts in dispute would make this issue one for the jury. [R.
1328-1347]
After this Court ruled in Jensen that fact issues existed with respect to whether the
statute of limitations barred the Hipwells' claims and remanded the case (including the
fraud claims) to the district court, a separate trial was held on the statute of limitations
issue. The jury returned its verdict in favor of the Hipwells that their claims were not
barred by the statute of limitations. [R. 2423]
Thereafter, Dr. Healy and IHC filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Confirm
Dismissal of Fraud Claims." [R. 2665-2676] The sole basis for the "motion" was that
this Court's decision in Jensen had supposedly dismissed the fraud claims. By
Memorandum Decision dated May 19, 2000, and an Order of June 5, 2000, the district
court granted the motion and dismissed the Hipwells' fraud claims on the erroneous
basis that this Court's decision in Jensen had dismissed those claims. [R. 2756-2758]
1.
In Jensen* the Supreme Court Specifically Confirmed the Continued
Existence of the Hipwells9 Fraud Claims.
In Jensen, the Hipwells argued that whether their claims were barred by a statute
of limitations involved the resolution of factual issues that must be decided by a jury. In
addition, the Hipwells argued that the three year general fraud statute of limitations
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applied tu their fraud claims, rather than the two year statute of limitations contained in
the Medical Malr v *
In determining which statute of limitations shoi:M h- :v~-'<* v

^ • *v-u ; ,
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this Court analyzed the extent to which the fraud claims paralleled the claims for
Irauduleni concealment ot medical malpractice. This Court concluded that there was
sufficient simila*"

•
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:

-. .: .aaiuiw oi iimuat.^ns

applies to cases of fraudulent concealment arisine at ui nicd-

-\^v

•• ^-. ' •'••••

at 336. . "he district court misinterpreted this analysis and used it as the specific basis for
dismissing the Hipwells'" fraud claims.1
However, Jensen c\cir]\ *.r n ,: .* ^n.. -iv • ; ir - :!: ' ! M U _

*. -uirat.^T

simply categorized them as claims for fraudulent concealment of medical malpractic " foi
purposes of determining the appropriate statute of limitations.

1

1 lie Jensen Court's language concerning damages is clearly dicta as the issue,
scope and amount of damages were not before the Court, In fact, at the time of the
Jensen decision, there had been no discovery conducted other than on the statute of
limitations. Dr. Healy and IHC had not moved for summary judgment on the basis that
there were no damages or that damages were somehow insufficient to support a fraud
claim and the issue of damages was not briefed. On that record, it would have been a
violation of due process for this Court to have ruled the Hipwells had not suffered
damages because the Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion had only been made and
granted on the basis of the statute of limitations and the Hipwells had never even been
given a hearing on the issue of damages.
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2.
The Supreme Court Affirmatively Ruled that the Hipwells' Fraud
Claims Would be Governed by a Two Year Statute of Limitations,
In Jensen, this Court remanded the entire case for trial (except the constructive
fraud claim against IHC that the district court had dismissed on the merits) because it
concluded that a jury should decide whether the two year medical malpractice statute of
limitations barred the Hipwells5 fraudulent concealment claims. The continued existence
of the Hipwells5 common law fraud claims for fraudulent concealment is confirmed by
this Court's holding in Jensen "that Shelly5s family's claims for common law fraud are
also governed by the two year medical malpractice statute of limitations found in Section
78-14-4... "[Jensen at 337]
This Court would not have bothered to tell the district court which statute of
limitations applied to the Hipwells5 common law fraud claims if those claims were being
dismissed by the Court.
This Court's decision in Jensen did not dismiss the Hipwells5 fraudulent
concealment claims. The district court erred in ruling that it did.
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE
HIPWELLS LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE
LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE SUPREME COURT'S PRIOR
RULING IN THIS CASE,
The Hipwells have not amended their Complaint in this case since 1993.2 After

the I lipwells

. •-.. ....:. = :ne statute of limitations issue, the district court set

trial on the merits for November ?U0H wnih ;i \\v\\ discovery sehciliili

1'he dish irl

court also set a deadline for amending the pleadings for January 31, 2000. [R. 2610] I he
Hipwells timely moved to amend their complaint to allege in accordance with this
i
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. . : ! . . i.;_ .

concealment with his attorney brother
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relationship existed between Dr. Healy and IHC and Di. Heal} was acv^v to further the
interests of IHC. [R 2624-2647J3
'

;

'

.;: .iiiijiiujj complaint as

part of the same order dismissing the Hipwells5 fraud claims. The sol.- !\i<;i< l.\ • c ; :.

2

From 1^93 inrougn me trial on the statute of limitations in October, 1999, the
sole focus of the case w?* *he ^tati^e of limitations issues, including an appeal addressing
that issue.
3

Jensen at 338. Although this language in the Jensen rehearing opinion was in the
context of the statute of limitations issue, it obviously applies with equal force to liability
issues.
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the motion to amend the fraud claims was the district court's decision to dismiss the
fraud claims based upon the district court's erroneous interpretation of this Court's
ruling in Jensen. [R. 2750-2758]
Under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend is to be
granted liberally in the interests of justice. Moreover, Rule 15(a) should be interpreted
liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated. Timm v. Dewsnup,
815 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). Denial of leave to amend is ordinarily reviewed on an
abuse of discretion standard. However, where, as here, leave to amend is denied based
on an erroneous legal ruling, the review is de novo. Fisher v. Roberts, 125 F.3d 974, 977
(6th Cir. 1997); St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815
(11th Cir. 1999) (where trial court's denial of leave to amend a complaint is due to
futility, the denial is reviewed de novo.) See also, City ofMonticello v. Christiansen,
788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990).
The Hipwells timely moved for leave to amend in accordance with the district
court's scheduling order. IHC and Dr. Healy did not demonstrate or even argue they
would be prejudiced by an amendment. They only argued leave to amend should be
denied on futility grounds based on this Court's decision in Jensen. [R. 2668] Because
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the district court erred in ruling that Jensen mandated dismissal of the fraud claims, the
district court's n'fns;il i<» 'tllaw siniendrneiU should jls<< he lev/rsed,
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
EVIDENCE THAT DR. HEALY AND HIS ATTORNEY BROTHER
FRAUDULENTLY CONCEALED THE MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE OF
DR. HEALY AND IHC.
Pnnr U\ (lit1 linhilih lii.il llir Hipwells

mil I .111 iiinifitiiiinv ol tJiiUoii, lilt nil a

Motion to Allow Evidence of Admissions by Conduct on the Part of Defendant Di
Healy. In that motion, the Hipwells made an offer of proof \\ iih respect to Dr. Healy's
......

..i attorney Healy and Sharp to conceal Shelly5s medical

malpractice claim., apamsl hi \W\\\\ -iiidlll*1 \R U , 7 0 ^ ^ l ; ^"?^^S""| l l r i hjiwclls
argued that Dr. Healy's conduct attempting to hide these claims constituted an admission
by conduct betraying an awareness of guilt or liability. The district court granted that
motion t :) the extent tl lat the I lip vv ells w ere ei ititled to mtroduce evidence of things that
Dr. Healy personally did or said from which th c i n *- < ' l

:

' - - * * 1 -;.

^*

that Dr. Healy was involved in an unlawful obstruction of justice. [R. 5016, pp. 1-2; R.
4568] However, prior to trial the district court ruled it would, not allow the Hipwells to
present evidence of \\« hat other people did and said as pai t :*f Di I lea.].)/ ' s conspiracy v ith
Attorney Healy and Sharp. [R. 5016, pp. 1-18, 24-26]
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It was error for the district court to preclude the Hipwells from presenting
evidence of what the co-conspirators, Attorney Healy, Sharp and Dr. Healy's sister,
DeVries, did and said in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 11A
P.2d 1141,1143 (Utah 1989); State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941); Cirios v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 373 S.E.2d 164, 167-168 (Va. App. 1988). The district
court later compounded this error by reversing itself completely during trial and refusing
to allow any evidence whatsoever of Dr. Healy's conduct in covering up the malpractice
claim.
The district court erroneously concluded that under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probativiness. [R. 12541259] The district court only changed its mind and precluded the evidence after the
Hipwells' counsel, in reliance upon the district court's initial ruling on this issue, had
informed the jury during opening statements that the Hipwells would show Dr. Healy
engaged in a cover up of his malpractice. [R. 5003, pp. 220-225]
The district court committed clear error in excluding this evidence. The
prejudicial effect of that exclusion was stunning and was exacerbated by the district
court's excluding the evidence after the Hipwells opening statement, thus, substantially
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A party's conduct showing an awareness of euilt or liability is a form of
admission, In its pretrial ruling dated March 21. 2uu i the district court noted at page 2:
• -. parties do not dispute me ia\v m Utah is that
w i ongdoing by a party "amounting to an obstruction of
justice," can be regarded as an admission by conduct.
[Citations omitted] [R. 4568]
There is ample support among both legal scholars and the courts - in Utah and
j.

u:. ^ J.. vvuintn/- i • /;c ajnnssioh oi ^oi.v.ui^i draymg an awareness of gin- ^

liabilit1
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that regard, McCormick's Handbook on the Law of Evidence §273 at 660 (Second Ed.
19 72) states:
i-v^ uii^ijL oe expected, wrongdoing by the party in
connection with his case, amounting to an obstruction
justice, is also commonly regarded as an admission b\
conduct. By resorting to wrongful devices, he is said to give
ground for believing that he thinks his case is weak and not
to be won by fair means.
7b the sc line effec i; st ; '€ ; 2 \\ igmore, Section 73 (No 2) (Chadbourne Re\ 1979).
Utah courts have embraced the doctrine of adniusion^ In rnndHi'i In ^ /.v" !
Loft, 17 P.2d 272 (Utah 1932) this Court, allowed the admission of a number of
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inconsistent statements that a defendant had made regarding his lack of responsibility for
the accident. The Court stated:
We think the testimony was relevant and admissible, not
upon the theory that the alleged statements or declarations
were part of the res gestae, but as bearing upon and as
indicative of the state of mind of the defendant with
reference to the accident.

[Quoting an older edition of Wigmore:] "It has always been
understood - the inference, indeed, is one of the simplest in
human experience - that a party's falsehood *** and all
similar conduct, is receivable against him as an indication of
his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one,
and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of
the cause's lack of truth and merit. The inference thus does
not apply itself necessarily to any specific fact in the cause,
but operates indefinitely though strongly, against the whole
mass of alleged facts constituting his cause." Wigmore on
Evidence, Vol.1, §278, and cases cited. [17 P.2d at 276-277]
More recently, in State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983), the trial court
allowed the apprehending officer of the accused to testify that the defendant said "I will
kill you" to a passer-by whom the officer had asked to summon help. In upholding the
trial court's decision to admit the evidence, this Court stated that "such conduct is
relevant as an admission by conduct, "constituting circumstantial evidence of
consciousness of guilt. . ." [663 P.2d at 165] [Emphasis added.]
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e\ idence admissible to sho vv conscioi isness of guilt); I : ""i' in is Ti 7 1 st and Sa\ >ing s Bt ink v.
Ali, 425 N.E. 2d 1359 (111. App. 1981) (doctor's alteration of medical records to conceal
negligence may be admitted into evidence as an admission by conduct); McNamara v.

Exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an r \ r !-MY::P::

•.- -. T, ih.r

• »e

used sparingly. See, e.g., United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, : 2 ^ i :v10in Cir. 20ui);
United States v. Martinez, 2001 TT 9 \ r - T cxis 495^ H 0th C - , 200 1 > The exclusion is
not pr< * •*; ;• •

:

* :/

* iiiiiiili •

substantia!;;- • aiwvu:. - .i.- r

value of the evidence. Unfair prejudice "means an undue tendency to ~KiiLrest decision
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." Tan, 254
i.:-c ..
I!

••

,;ie case at bar, the evidence of the cover up was highly relevant to Dr.
M.>

.

exactly what made the evidence admissible. See, McCool v. Gehret, 657 A.2d 269, 27778 (Del. 1995). This evidence would not have unfairly prejudiced Dr. Healy or IHC by

The jury could have reasonably inferred from the cover up evidence s u m n u n / c d
above (SOF Nos. 13-30) that Dr. Healy had engaged in a fraudulent conspiracy to cover41

up his malpractice. This evidence was extremely probative on Dr. Healy's awareness of
his malpractice. This evidence also could have had a profound impact on Dr. Healy's
credibility with the jury when he denied that he believed that he had done anything
wrong in his care of Shelly and when he denied he was given information on Shelly's
visit to the emergency room. With this evidence, the jury may have rejected Dr. Healy's
testimony and concluded that he believed he had committed malpractice, that he had the
information concerning the emergency room visit and should have delivered Shelly early
in the morning of December 12 as Dr. Devore testified. According to Dr. Devore, had
this been done, the complications Shelly suffered and her ultimate death would have
been avoided.
Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman were co-managing Shelly's care in the ICU and
jointly decided to transfer her to the University Hospital without the Hipwells' consent.
The jury could have concluded this was a pretext to conceal their malpractice and that
Dr. Healy's subsequent actions to cover up the malpractice at McKay-Dee were
undertaken to further this effort and at least in part to further the interests of IHC.
The district court's refusal to allow this evidence seriously prejudiced the
Hipwells in the presentation of their malpractice claim against Dr. Healy and IHC.
Under Utah law, an erroneous decision to exclude evidence is harmful error "if absent
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the error there is a reasonable likei..i^„. -I an outcome moK iavorabiv. .u the appellant.
State i ; Dunn , 850 I "' 2d I 2(31 1221 (I Jtah 1993) See ilso, <r« : u fla. s v Ii; o ") ' 2 ele\ i sion
Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Uiah 1996) (Error is harmful where "the likelihood of
a different outcome in the absence of the error is sufficiently high so as to undermine
:
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should therefore be reversed and the ca se remanded foi a lie \ v lli ial
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING T O A L L O W T H E
HIPWELLS' MEDICAL EXPERT TO GIVE A N OPINION REGARDING
A BREACH OF THE STANDARD OF CARE BY IHC'S EMERGENCY
ROOM,
"! '* ' :

'•!.:•,.

.

.* •

j tn.- :• I--X-, .vV *

:

sdical

experts, Dr. Devore and Dr. Barry Schifrin, from testifying at trial concerning certain
matters, including Shelly's treatment in the McKay-Dee emergency room, on the basis
they vv ere not • :p lalified to testify concerning such care [R 3980 4 00 / ]
The district court denied this motion, finding that these individi lals we re q i lalifi :xi
to testify regarding Shelly's obstetric treatment "assuming proper qualifications of the
laying . :>i.ii..-.;;; lounaauon,

i u. 4:x>6-4M)^; K. :>( . Oaipp 24-2(>|

Therefore, d:i iring opening statements, the I lipv > "lis' cc i iiisel on ltlined fc i tl le ji n >
the medical malpractice that had occurred in Shelly 5s case beginning with her care in the
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emergency room on the morning of December 12, 1988, when Shelly arrived suffering
from severe epigastric pain with clear symptoms of pre-eclampsia\HELLP syndrome.
Instead of appropriately treating her, the emergency room physician simply sent her
home with Tylenol. [R. 5003 at pp. 197-198; 204-208]
However, at trial, the district court reversed itself and refused to allow Dr. Devore
to testify concerning the negligence of the emergency room, dismissed the claim
concerning emergency room treatment and instructed the jury that the emergency room
was not negligent. [R. 5004 at pp. 396-402; R. 5011 at pp. 1814-1815; R. 4904]4 The
district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Devore's testimony.
The district court's apparent basis for precluding Dr. Devore from testifying
concerning whether the standard of care was breached in the emergency room was
because Dr. Devore was not board certified in internal medicine or emergency medicine
and did not consider himself qualified to sit for the American College of Emergency
Physician boards and has never become familiar with any of the texts, journals or
treatises involving emergency medicine, except as it related to pregnancy complications
and that since Dr. Devore had worked in an emergency room at Yale how emergency
4

Because the district court would not allow Dr. Devore to testify concerning the
emergency room treatment, the Hipwells did not call Dr. Schifrin because the ruling
would have also precluded his testimony.
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departments are staff ed ai id how tl ie>- function and are trained are totally different. [R.
5004 at pp. 381 386]
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However, the district court apparently applied the wrong legal standard in
excluding Dr. Devore's testimony. These facts only went to the weight to be accorded to
Dr. D e \ ore's testimony .,. and not tc • its adn lissibilitj - See, e.g .,, State q / I hah v Kel ley, 1
P.3d 546, 550 (Utah 2000). The "critical factor in determining the competency of an
expert is whether that expert has knowledge that can assist the trier oi luct in reviewing
the issues before it'

W essell v. Erickson Landscaping

( u., . , i \\2K. _;-W. _ V u Kii,

l(ls^».
Dr. Devore is an obstetrician/gynecologist specializing in maternal fetal medicine
in high risk pregnancies. Pre-eclampsia and HELLP syndrome are recognized
complications of high risk pregnancies an,;, ... .ac;., diseases only suffered by pregnant
women. Di De\ oi e has w orked in emergency rooms and • - a s fi ill)/ familial \ v itl I
emergency room procedures in the various hospitals at which he had worked with respect
to the handling and treatment of obstetric patients. [SOF Nos. ? 1 -41]
Di De v ore testified that the standai d of cai e w as i inifoi m in the hospitals at
which he had worked and that he was familiar with the standard of care for emergency
room care of a third trimester obstetrical patient such as Shelly. Dr. Devore specifically

testified he was aware of IHC's policies and procedures in that regard during December
of 1988 and January of 1989 when Shelly was treated because he was Director of
Maternal Fetal Medicine for IHC at the time. Dr. Devore was competent to testify that
an emergency room physician was not qualified to treat Shelly5 s symptoms, that the
standard of care required that the physician consult with Dr. Healy and provide to Dr.
Healy the information concerning Shelly's treatment that had been gathered in the
emergency room and that this standard of care was breached. [SOF Nos. 38-41]
Dr. Devore was fully qualified to testify as to whether an emergency room
physician could properly and appropriately treat a high risk third trimester obstetrics
patient just as a brain surgeon could appropriately testify as to whether a general
practitioner is qualified to perform brain surgery.
This Court has held that "ordinarily, a practitioner of one school of medicine is
not competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner of
another school." Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). However, this
Court in Burton recognized exceptions to the rule, including where " sufficient
foundation has been laid to show that the method of treatment - - and hence the standard
of care - - is common to both schools." [711 P.2d at 248] Another exception recognized
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lyy 1:1 le coi n I:s is \ v 1 len 1:1 le expei !: w itness is ki IO wledgeable aboi it tl le standard c i care c i
another speciality. See, Dikeou v. Osborn, 811 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah App. 1994).
Both of these exceptions apply in the case at bar. D' De\ ore \\ as knowledgeable
about the emergency room standard of care and that standard require,i ;ne emergency
room physician to refer Shell)/ to an obstetrician

\ iici, becai i se Shell;; - coi lid onb • be

appropriately treated by an obstetrician, Dr. Devore was knowledgeable concerning the
applicable standard of care. Moreover, once the IHC emergency room physician
undertook to treat Shelly, he was charged w ith the same stanaard oi care apphcaoie to a
physician that w oi lid be qi lalified to treat her, See, W

>•
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661 So.2d 714, 720 (Miss. 1995); Larsen v. Yelle, 246 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. 1976);
Lewis v. Soriano, 374 So.2d 829, 831 (Miss. 1979).
' . ; . . '

!>V-J-';*^:,

w. . , . .

-.

•

t.

-i

.

i

.

a

v \ A\- V tiMimi r

lepCii

,

- ,

"^ : consequent dismissal

of the emergency room malpractice claim constituted clear error. This error requires
reversal n> din-• •. u<. * upwells to present their emergency room malpractice claim to a

claims because the refusal to permit Dr. Devore to testify that the standard of care was
breached by the emergency room and the dismissal of the claim very well could have

substantially impacted the jury's verdict. The evidence concerning the emergency room
malpractice was compelling. The jury well may have believed from the evidence that it
was extremely negligent for the emergency room to have simply sent Shelly home with
Tylenol rather than appropriately treating her symptoms. Yet, the district court told the
jury the emergency room had not been negligent and this claim was dismissed. The jury
could have determined that the other claims of negligence against Dr. Healy and IHC
involving their subsequent treatment of Shelly were less egregious and therefore
concluded that if what the emergency room did was not negligent, neither was the
subsequent treatment.
Plaintiffs' case involves a continuum of medical negligence and concealment that
was triggered by the negligence at the McKay-Dee Emergency Room. Absent that
negligence, the subsequent medical negligence and concealment probably would not
have occurred. The emergency room's failure to correctly diagnose or refer Shelly to an
obstetrician caused a 36 hour delay in the delivery of Shelly's baby during which
Shelly's liver was under attack from HELLP Syndrome. Shelly's liver rupture the
morning after the birth probably would not have occurred had she been immediately
delivered following her emergency room visit. [R. 5004 at pp. 444-447]
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V\< ithout the ruptured liver, she would not have negligently been allowed to bleed
internally for hoi irs in tl le ICI J resi llting in the critically ill conditio! 1 in \ hicl i she was
shipped (without family permission) to the University of Utah Hospital. When Shelly's
heart was negligently punctured at the University, her critically ill condition made it
impossible to recover from the insult, resulting in a permanent semi-comatose state.

attorney to conceal the medical negligence that had occurred at McKay-Dee Hospital.
The Plaintiffs focused their case on the emergency room in both opening

'b i' ^'"..°h !:

]

^ ? r : preeclampsia (HHIJ P Sviivlror* ^ ir ihc emergency room and that

the only treatment was immediate delivery. Even Dr. I leai\ admitted if HELLP had
been diagnosed on the day of Shelly's emergency room visit, the baby would have been
• delivered that da;; > [R 5006, pp 919 920.] Di D :^ ^ore testified that failure to deli\ er
Shelly's baby on this day breached the standard of care and resulted in the severe
complications that Shelly subsequently suffered. [R 5004, pp. 444-447] Where the
subsequent negligence and concealment inn\juu:.u.,. ;:

J emergency room

malpractice dismissal of that claim serioi isl> ii npacte :i the remaining claims of
negligence and the instruction to the jury that the emergency room had not been
negligent was an improper comment on what was left of the Hipwells' case.
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Moreover, once again, the district court's exclusion of this evidence and
instruction that the emergency room was not negligent after the Hipwells had told the
jury during opening statements that the evidence would show the emergency room was
negligent could have substantially impacted the credibility of Hipwells5 counsel with the
jury and colored the jury's view of all the evidence presented by the Hipwells.
The Hipwells should be entitled to present all their evidence of malpractice to the
jury and have the jury determine the Hipwells' claims based on the entirety of that
evidence. The district court's exclusion of Dr. Devore's testimony cut the legs off the
Hipwells' case and certainly undermines confidence in the jury's verdict. See, Jouflas
supra.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Judgment should be reversed and the entire case remanded for a new trial. In the
alternative, the case should be remanded for a new trial on the fraud and emergency room
negligence claims.
DATED this the <~} day of December, 2001.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

Richard D. Burbidge
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee"), and
Michael J. Healy, M.D. ("Dr. Healy"), ruling that plaintiffs
Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell's action was barred by the
medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 78-14-4 of
the Utah Code. Jensen and Hipwell appealed the grant of summary

judgment under section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. We reverse
and remand to the trial court for resolution of a fact question
relevant to the tolling of the statute of limitations.
A detailed recitation of the facts is necessary to
understand the complex legal issues presented by this appeal.
xx>
Before we recite the facts, we note that in reviewing a grant
of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.'" K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624
(Utah 1994) (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,
233 (Utah 1993)). Because McKay-Dee and Dr. Healy moved for
summary judgment, we state the facts in the light most favorable
to Jensen and Hipwell.
Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell are, respectively, the
surviving mother and husband of Shelly Hipwell. They seek to
recover for Shelly's wrongful death on behalf of themselves and
as legal guardians of Shelly's two minor daughters (collectively
"Shelly's family") . On December 12, 1988, the day before a
scheduled induced delivery of her second daughter, Shelly
experienced severe abdominal pain and went to the emergency room
of McKay-Dee Hospital. After being sent home, Shelly returned to
McKay-Dee on December 13th for a caesarian delivery of her baby.
Shelly experienced various complications at McKay-Dee after the
delivery, which Shelly's family claims were the result of
malpractice and negligence on the part of McKay-Dee and
Dr. Healy, Shelly's obstetrician. On December 23rd, Shelly was
transferred to the University of Utah Hospital for further
treatment. At University Hospital, Shelly suffered anoxic brain
damage after a resident physician punctured her heart with a
biopsy needle, leaving her in a coma, totally and permanently
disabled. Shelly subsequently died some three and a half years
later, on May 27, 1992.
In early 1989, while Shelly was at University Hospital
in a coma, Dr. Healy discussed Shelly's case with his brother,
attorney Tim Healy. After this discussion, attorney Healy had
discussions with the Healys' sister, Diane DeVries. In the
course of those discussions, attorney Healy asked DeVries to call
Shelly's family and recommend attorney Roger Sharp, a Salt Lake
attorney who specialized in medical malpractice cases. DeVries
had known Shelly's family for some time. DeVries contacted
Shelly's family but did not tell them that the Healys were her
brothers, nor did she tell them that she was also Dr. Healy's
file clerk. Shelly's family retained attorney Roger Sharp on
February 10, 1989, to represent Shelly in a medical malpractice
case. Three days later, attorney Healy wrote to attorney Sharp,
confirming a fee-splitting arrangement. Shelly's family was not
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aware of attorney Healy's involvement in the case or of Diane
DeVries' relationship with Dr. Healy and attorney Healy. The
letter from attorney Healy to attorney Sharp makes clear that
attorney Healy was communicating with Dr. Healy about attorney
Sharp's investigation and implies that attorney Sharp's
investigation of Dr. Healy's treatment was to be minimal.
As part of his investigation, attorney Sharp sent a
document request to Dr. Healy, seeking "a copy of all medical
records regarding [Shelly] Hipwell." Dr. Healy did not produce a
copy of all medical records, but instead produced a selective set
of documents that he personally reviewed. Attorney Sharp never
received a copy of Shelly's complete medical records from
Dr. Healy. By letter, attorney Sharp also requested a copy of
Shelly's complete medical records from McKay-Dee Hospital.
However, he subsequently orally limited that request and
ultimately received only limited medical records from McKay-Dee.
On May 6, 1989, attorney Sharp and Shelly's family settled her
case against University Hospital for $250,000, the amount of the
previously effective statutory cap on damages against the
University.1
In mid-198 9, Shelly was transferred from McKay-Dee
Hospital, to which she had returned from University Hospital on
April 14, 1989, to the Greenery, a rehabilitation facility in
Washington State. Carol Pederson, a social worker at the
Greenery, contacted attorney Simon Forgette on August 10, 1989,
to request that he provide an opinion of the settlement in
Shelly's case and evaluate the conduct of her attorneys in
settling the case. At that time, Forgette's memos to the file
regarding the possible new case indicate that Forgette understood
that Shelly's liver had been lacerated during her caesarian
delivery at McKay-Dee. On August 29th, Forgette contacted
Pederson, who assured him that she had the family's permission to
discuss Shelly's case. She identified Sharp as Shelly's Utah
attorney. That same day, Pederson wrote a letter to Forgette in
which she stated, "Ms. Jensen [Shelly's mother] has requested you
to offer an opinion on the settlement reached in this case, and
advise the family regarding any further legal action which might

1

This court struck down the statutory cap on medical
malpractice damages as unconstitutional on May 1, 1989, in
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989),
approximately five days before Shelly's family agreed to the
$250,000 settlement offered by the University. Attorney Sharp
knew of our decision in Condemarin when the settlement was agreed
to, and his actions in that case have been the subject of
litigation. See Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993).
3
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be indicated." On September 18th, Forgette reviewed medical
records provided by Pederson and asked that she arrange for a
meeting with Ms. Jensen, Shelly's mother. His understanding at
that time was still that Shelly's liver had been lacerated at
McKay-Dee. Forgette's memo to his file also indicates that he
needed to determine "the statute of limitations on bringing any
claim against hospitals or against attorneys."
On October 19, 1989, Ms. Jensen, Shelly's mother,
traveled to Washington and met with Forgette to discuss Shelly's
case. Ms. Jensen orally retained Forgette on this date and
Forgette was to request a copy of attorney Sharp's file.
Forgette's memo to the file at this time indicates that he was
working with a Utah attorney who was doing some background
investigations regarding Shelly's case and the settlement with
University Hospital. This attorney wanted to "remain in the
background" because he had worked with attorney Sharp in the past
and received a significant amount of business from McKay-Dee.
The memo to the file also indicates that, after meeting with
Shelly's mother, Forgette's understanding was that Shelly's liver
"had been either damaged or had burst" while she was at McKayDee. On October 20th, Forgette wrote to Sharp requesting a copy
of his file on Shelly. By December 14th, Ms. Jensen still had
not signed a formal retainer and Forgette had still not received
Sharp's file. On that date, Forgette drafted a retainer
agreement to send to Ms. Jensen, which provided that Forgette was
to handle claims against McKay-Dee Hospital, University Hospital,
Roger Sharp, attorney Healy and/or others. On December 26th,
Forgette received a portion of Sharp's file, but he did not
receive the entire file until February 15, 1990. In the
meantime, the present plaintiffs, Ms. Jensen and Shayne Hipwell
(Shelly's husband), signed Forgette's written retainer agreement
on January 17, 1990.
When Forgette received Sharp's file on February 15th,
he learned of attorney Healy's involvement in the case and
learned that Sharp's file did not contain a complete set of
medical records from Dr. Healy or McKay-Dee Hospital. Forgette
did not file a notice of intent to commence suit in the instant
case against McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy until almost two
years later, on December 16, 1991.2 Shelly Hipwell died on

2

Section 78-14-8 of the Utah Code provides that a medical
malpractice action may not commence "unless and until the
plaintiff gives the prospective defendant . . . at least ninety
days' prior notice of intent to commence an action." If the
filing of the notice of intent comes less than 90 days before the
(Footnote continued on the next page.)
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May 27, 1992, and Forgette filed the complaint in this suit on
July 29, 1992.
After allowing the parties to complete discovery, the
trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee
on February 21, 1995, ruling that the two-year statute of
limitations governing medical malpractice actions contained in
section 78-14-4 of the Utah Code had run by December of 1991,
when Forgette filed his notice of intent. On appeal, Shelly's
family makes a series of arguments, which are summarized below.
First, Shelly's family contends that the wrongful death
statute of limitations, section 78-12-28(2) of the Code, applies
to their wrongful death claims. They argue that their claims
cannot be barred until two years after Shelly's death because the

2

(Footnote continued.)
end of the limitations period for filing a medical malpractice
action, the limitation period "shall be extended to 120 days from
the date of service of notice." Id. Further, within 60 days of
filing a notice of intent, the plaintiff must submit a request
for prelitigation panel review. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-12(1) (c) (2) (a) . But see Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d
1131 (Utah 1992) (holding that action may not be dismissed for
failure to file request for prelitigation review within 60 days
of notice of intent) . That section also provides that upon
filing a request for prelitigation review, the statute of
limitations is tolled until 60 days after the prelitigation panel
issues its opinion. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3).
We note that Shelly's family filed its notice of intent on
December 16, 1991, but did not file its lawsuit until July 29,
1992, more than 120 days after filing the notice of intent. Both
parties before this court briefed the issues as if December 16,
1989, the date two years before the filing of the notice of
intent, was the relevant date for statute of limitations
purposes. We can only assume that Shelly's family's failure to
file its lawsuit within 120 days of that date was due to their
having filed a request for prelitigation review and waiting for
the panel's decision. However, we find no indication of this in
the record. If Shelly's family did not file a prelitigation
review request, the filing of the lawsuit more than 120 days
after the filing of the notice of intent may be fatal to the
entire suit. See Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934
(Utah 1981) (holding that where notice of intent was filed less
than 90 days before running of limitations period and lawsuit was
not filed within 120 days of filing notice of intent, suit was
properly dismissed). We do not address this issue because it was
not presented to us.
5

No. 950164

wrongful death statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the decedent's death. In the alternative, they argue that if the
medical malpractice statute of limitations contained in section
78-14-4 of the Code applies in cases of wrongful death due to
medical malpractice, the two-year period it contains should not
begin to run until the decedent's death. We reject both these
claims.
Second, Shelly's family asserts that the running of the
statute of limitations on both Shelly's personal injury claims
(which survived her death and are now asserted by her family) and
their wrongful death claims should be tolled because of
Dr. Healy's alleged fraudulent concealment of the facts upon
which their claims are grounded. The trial court ruled that
Shelly's family's oral retention of attorney Forgette on
October 19, 1989, more than two years before the filing of the
notice of intent, "demonstrated that Forgette was in possession
of facts whereby he knew or should have known that [Shelly]
Hipwell's condition was caused or possibly caused by negligence
on the part of McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy." We conclude
that this is a disputed issue of fact that precludes summary
judgment.
Third, Shelly's family argues that Shelly Hipwell's
minor children should be allowed to proceed with claims for
wrongful death because the children's minority tolled the statute
of limitations as to their claims. Last, Shelly's family argues
that they should be allowed to proceed on their separate claims
for common law fraud, which are governed by a three-year statute
of limitations. We reject both claims.
Returning in depth to Shelly's family's first argument
concerning the statute of limitations that applies to their
wrongful death claims: Shelly's family reasons that because this
is a claim for wrongful death, section 78-12-28(2) of the Code,
which governs wrongful death, is the applicable statute of
limitations, rather than the Medical Malpractice Act statute of
limitations contained in section 78-14-4, as the trial court
held. Shelly's family further argues that the two-year limit in
the wrongful death statute does not begin to run until the
decedent's death.
When we are faced with two statutes that purport to
cover the same subject, we seek to determine the legislature's
intent as to which applies. In doing this, we follow the general
rules of statutory construction, which provide both that "the
best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the
statute," Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah
1993) (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d
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903, 906 (Utah 1984)), and that " x a more specific statute governs
instead of a more general statute.'" De Baritault v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1996) (quoting Pan Energy v.
Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted)). In
this case, the Medical Malpractice Act's plain language indicates
a legislative intent to have the statute apply to claims such as
the ones Shelly's family seeks to bring.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act specifically
provides, "No malpractice action . . . may be brought unless it
is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers . . . the injury." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. The Act
defines "malpractice actions" to which the Act was intended to
apply as "any action against a health care provider, whether in
contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise,
based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out
of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the
health care provider." Id. § 78-14-3(14) (emphasis added).
Clearly, the legislature intended that the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act apply to actions for wrongful death based upon
personal injuries arising out of medical malpractice. Further,
this statute is more specific than the general wrongful death
statute of limitations, applying as it does only to wrongful
death actions arising out of medical malpractice. Therefore, we
hold that the two-year statute of limitations governing medical
malpractice actions covers this action for wrongful death arising
out of medical malpractice.
Shelly's family next argues that if the medical
malpractice statute of limitations governs their claims for
wrongful death, the event that begins the running of the statute
is the decedent's death. The medical malpractice statute of
limitations provides that a medical malpractice action must be
brought "within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (emphasis
added). Shelly's family argues that the "injury" in a wrongful
death case arising out of medical malpractice is not the
malpractice itself but is, rather, the death. They argue that
because there can be no cause of action for wrongful death until
death occurs, the statute of limitations on their claims cannot
begin to run until Shelly's death.
We have held that an action for wrongful death is an
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased, Van
Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 303 (Utah 1947). This
is conceptually compatible with Shelly's family's assertion of a
right to proceed independent of any analysis of Shelly's predeath
rights against her physicians. However, we have not entirely

7
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separated the heirs' right from the decedent's because the heirs'
right is in major part based on rights of support, both financial
and emotional, that run to them from the deceased. Accordingly,
we have held that the wrongful death cause of action is based on
the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed
subject to at least some of the defenses that would have been
available against the decedent had she lived to maintain her own
action. See, e.g., Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152,
1155 (Utah 1989) (comparative negligence). The question here is
whether we should separate the death from the causative wrong
sufficiently to permit a wrongful death action where the
decedent's personal injury cause of action had been barred at the
time of death. We decline to adopt such a rule.
As one of the foremost authorities on the law of torts
has observed, the rationale underlying the rule barring the heirs
from bringing a wrongful death suit after the injured patient has
brought suit on the underlying personal injury action is that
"the injured individual is not merely a conduit for the support
of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the
case or win or lose a judgment on his own injury even though
others may be dependent upon him." W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5th ed.
1984). The majority of states refuses to allow a decedent's
heirs to proceed with a wrongful death suit after the decedent
has settled his or her personal injury case or won or lost a
judgment before dying. Id. Given the underlying rationale, and
given that the core purpose of any statute of limitations is to
compel exercise of a right within a reasonable time to avoid
stale claims, loss of evidence, and faded memories, Horton v.
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989), we see no
reason to impose a different rule regarding the heirs'
maintenance of a wrongful death suit where an injured patient has
chosen to let the statute of limitations run on the underlying
personal injury claim rather than settling or litigating the
claim. Therefore, we hold that in wrongful death claims arising
out of medical malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations
is section 78-14-4 of the Code, and the statute begins to run at
the time the "patient discovers or, through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs," meaning the time the patient discovers or should have
discovered the medical malpractice injury. Thus, Shelly's
family's wrongful death claims are barred by the statute of
limitations, unless, as we discuss below, the statute was tolled
for some reason.3

3

Shelly's family also argues that they are entitled to
(Footnote continued on the next page.)
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Notwithstanding the two-year statute of limitations
governing their claims. Shelly's family argues that they are
entitled to maintain these actions because the statute of
limitations was tolled by Dr. Healy and attorney Healy's fraud
sufficiently long that attorney Forgette's notice of intent was
timely. Disposition of this claim requires a rather in-depth
discussion of the complex law of fraudulent concealment.
Fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal
duty or obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or
otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him. 37 Am.
Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 145 (1968). Such a duty or obligation
may arise from a relationship of trust between the parties, an
inequality of knowledge or power between the parties, or other
attendant circumstances indicating reliance. Id. The party's
silence must amount to fraud, i.e., silence under the
circumstances must amount to an affirmation that a state of
things exists which does not exist, and the uninformed party must
be deprived to the same extent as if a positive assertion had
been made. Id. Such xx [c] oncealment or nondisclosure becomes
fraudulent only when there is an existing fact or condition . . .
which the party charged is under a duty to disclose." Id.
Making use of a device that misleads, some trick or contrivance
that is intended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry, may
also amount to fraudulent concealment. Id. It is this aspect of
fraudulent concealment that is at issue in the instant case.

3

(Footnote continued.)
proceed with Shelly's personal injury/medical malpractice claims
as her personal representatives and/or heirs under the survival
statutes. The survival statutes provide that a deceased person's
personal injury action does not abate when that person dies, but
rather survives the person's death and may be brought by the
deceased's personal representatives or heirs. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-11-12. However, if the person has not brought suit before
her death, her personal representatives or heirs may bring suit
only if the person died before the time allowed for bringing suit
had expired, and then they must bring suit within one year of the
person's death. See id. § 78-12-37.
Absent any reason to toll the statute, the two-year statute
of limitations governing Shelly Hipwell's medical
malpractice/personal injury claims, section 78-14-4, had run by
the time she died. If Shelly did not bring suit before the time
allowed for doing so had expired, her personal injury cause of
action did not survive her death, and thus her family cannot
bring a survival claim.
9
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Applying the facts of Shelly's case to these
requirements, Shelly's family's argument must run as follows:
(i) Dr. Healy was in a position of superior knowledge and was the
beneficiary of Shelly's and her family's trust; (ii) this
superior knowledge and position of trust created a duty to
disclose material facts regarding Shelly's care; (iii) Dr. Healy
knew of his brother's involvement with attorney Sharp and knew of
the cursory nature of attorney Sharp's investigation but did not
disclose these facts to Shelly's family or, alternatively,
concealed them from Shelly's family to divert attention from his
alleged malpractice; (iv) Dr. Healy knew that Shelly's family
would rely on attorney Sharp's investigation to uncover any
malpractice on his part, thus creating a duty on his part to
disclose the facts of his association with attorneys Healy and
Sharp; (v) in this manner, Dr. Healy used his position of
influence with his brother and attorney Sharp to divert Shelly's
family's attention away from his care of Shelly, thereby
preventing them from discovering the facts constituting the
alleged malpractice.
Once this argument is reduced to its basic elements, it
is clear that attorney Sharp's investigation cannot be used to
start the statute of limitations running against Shelly's
claims.4 What is not as clear is whether Dr. Healy's alleged
fraudulent concealment was sufficient to continue tolling the
statute of limitations once Shelly's family retained attorney

4

Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee argue that attorney Sharp's
investigation of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital in early 1989
triggered the statute of limitations as to medical malpractice
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. We decline to follow
this logic on the facts as they are presented to us. While under
general principles of agency law, the knowledge of an agent is to
be imputed to the principal, it is well established that, where
the agent has interests in the transaction adverse to the
principal's, or where the agent colludes with third parties whose
interests are adverse to the principal's interests, knowledge of
the facts at issue will not be imputed to the principal. See 3
Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 290 (1986). In the instant case, attorney
Sharp's fee-splitting agreement with attorney Healy and the
implication in attorney Healy's letter to attorney Sharp that
Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy's care of Shelly was to be
minimal indicate that attorney Sharp was, at the least, acting in
concert with third parties whose interests were adverse to Shelly
Hipwell's. Therefore, his investigation of Dr. Healy and his
consideration of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee as potential defendants
in a malpractice action cannot be used to start the statute of
limitations running on Shelly's claims.
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Forgette in the fall of 1989. As noted above, Shelly's family
contends that they had no facts that could have led them to
suspect malpractice by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee until February of
1990, when they discovered the relationships among Dr. Healy,
attorney Healy, Diane DeVries, and attorney Sharp. In contrast,
Dr. Healy contends that attorney Forgette considered Dr. Healy
and McKay-Dee as potential defendants in a medical malpractice
suit on Shelly Hipwell's behalf as early as December 14, 1989, as
evidenced by his retainer agreement prepared on that date, which
included references to Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. Shelly's family
presented attorney Forgette's affidavit as evidence that he
included Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee in his retainer agreement with
Shelly's family merely to "cover all the bases" but was retained
solely to investigate legal malpractice on the part of attorney
Sharp in settling Shelly's claims against University Hospital for
her punctured heart.
The trial court made what amounts to a mixed finding of
fact and conclusion of law on disputed evidence, to wit, that
Forgette's "oral retention of October 19, 1989 clearly
demonstrated that Forgette was in possession of facts whereby he
knew or should have known that [Shelly] Hipwell's condition was
caused or possibly caused by negligence on the part of McKay-Dee
Hospital and Dr. Healy." (Emphasis added.) This finding and
conclusion is inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." K & T, Inc., 888 P.2d at 626-27 (citing
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235). " x We determine
. . . whether the trial court . . . correctly held that there
were no disputed issues of material fact.'" Id. (quoting Ferree
v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)). Here, the trial court
erred.
The error committed here directly parallels that made
by the trial court in Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah
1996). In Berenda, we specifically stated:
The application of this legal rule [of
fraudulent concealment] to any particular set
of facts is necessarily a matter left to
trial courts and finders of fact. . . .
[W]e
explicitly acknowledge that weighing the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in
light of the defendant's steps to conceal the
cause of action necessitates the type of
factual findings which preclude summary
judgment in all but the clearest of cases.
Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only

11
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when the facts fall on two opposite ends of a
factual continuum: either (i) when the facts
are so clear that reasonable persons could
not disagree about the underlying facts or
about the application of the governing legal
standard to the facts or (ii) when the facts
underlying the allegation of fraudulent
concealment are so tenuous, vague, or
insufficiently established that they fail to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
concealment, with the result that the claim
fails as a matter of law.
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54. In that case, we held that the
plaintiff's letters to his partner/defendant reflecting the
plaintiff's suspicion that the partner was misappropriating
partnership assets were insufficient to underlie a trial court
finding that the plaintiff was under a duty to make inquiries,
which would have led to discovery of the cause of action. Id.
We found that the letter equally supported the plaintiff's
contention that he voiced his suspicions in the letters in an
attempt to find out if the company "was really broke." Id. We
said that "while it may be *a close call,' . . . we cannot agree
that, as a matter of law, the two letters demonstrate that
[plaintiff] should have suspected [defendant's] wrongdoing or,
more importantly, that an inquiry would reasonably have led to
discovery of the misappropriation." Id. at 55.
The issue before the trier of fact in this case is
whether attorney Forgette discovered or reasonably should have
discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell before
December 16, 1989. In other words, the jury must determine
whether the facts in this case indicate that Dr. Healy's
fraudulent concealment somehow prevented Shelly's family, who, by
retaining attorney Forgette, had defeated the collusion of
Dr. Healy with his brother and attorney Sharp, from inquiring
into the possibility of medical malpractice on the part of
Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. The question becomes: Would a
reasonable attorney, presented with the facts that attorney
Forgette knew in December of 1989, have considered investigating
a medical malpractice case against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee? This
is a genuine issue of material fact, which precludes summary
judgment in this case. Therefore, we remand to the trial court
on this issue, the outcome of which will determine whether
Shelly's family is entitled to proceed on both their survival
claims and their wrongful death claims.
Shelly's family's next argument is that even though the
statute of limitations bars the adult plaintiffs, Shelly's
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children were minors at the time of her injury and death and,
therefore, section 78-12-36, the tolling statute, came into play
and prevented the statute of limitations from running on their
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee.
This argument fails because the children's situation
does not fit within the tolling statute's terms. Section
78-12-36 provides, "If a person entitled to bring an action . . .
is at the time the cause of action accrued, [i] either under the
age of minority or mentally incompetent and [ii] without a legal
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-36 (bracketed material added). Shelly's children were
not entitled to bring an action for wrongful death because Shelly
had an appointed guardian at the time of her death.5 The
wrongful death statute provides:
When the death of a person not a minor is
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs, or his personal
representatives for the benefit of his heirs,
may maintain an action for damages against
the person causing the death . . . . If such
adult person has a guardian at the time of
his death, only one action can be maintained
for the injury to or death of such person,
and such action may be brought by either the
personal representatives of such adult
deceased person, for the benefit of his
heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of
the heirs . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (emphasis added) . The statute thus
clearly provides that if a guardian has been appointed, only the
personal representative or guardian may bring suit and the heirs
are no longer entitled to maintain an action. In this case,
Shayne Hipwell and Sherry Jensen were appointed as Shelly's
guardians. Under the statute's plain language, Shelly's children
were not entitled to bring an action for her wrongful death, and
the tolling statute becomes irrelevant as the children had no
claims.

5

A separate question
tolling statute would have
wrongful death claims even
run on Shelly's underlying
died.

we do not address is whether the
applied to save the children's
though the statute of limitations had
personal injury claims by the time she
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As a final argument, Shelly's family seeks to avoid the
two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations by bringing
their claim within the three-year fraud statute of limitations.
During the pendency of the litigation below, Shelly's family
amended their complaint to allege common law fraud. Shelly' s
family argues that the statute of limitations for fraud, section
78-12-26(3), governs these fraud claims, giving them three years
from the time they discovered the facts constituting the fraud in
which to bring their action.
The trial court ruled that section
78-14-4(1) (b), the two-year medical malpractice statute of
limitations, governed Shelly's family's claims for fraud.
Alternatively, the court held that if the three-year statute
applies, Shelly's family had established sufficient issues of
material fact to withstand summary judgment on their fraud
claims. Shelly's family seeks reversal of the first prong of
this holding, and Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee seek reversal of the
second. We uphold the trial court's ruling that the medical
malpractice statute of limitations governs Shelly's family's
fraud claims, and we need not reach the second ruling.
As stated above, when faced with two statutes that
purport to cover the same subject, our primary duty "is to
determine legislative intent, and the best evidence of
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute."
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879. A settled rule of statutory
construction, which helps us determine legislative intent,
provides that "a more specific statute governs instead of a more
general statute." De Baritault, 913 P.2d at 748 (citation
omitted). The medical malpractice statute of limitations
provides a two-year limit on bringing medical malpractice
actions. The statute includes a discovery rule, providing that
the two-year limitations period does not begin to run until the
"patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1). In Utah, the discovery rule includes the
judicially created doctrine of fraudulent concealment. See
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. The fraudulent concealment doctrine is
a mechanism whereby a plaintiff "can avoid the full operation of
the discovery rule by making a prima facie showing of fraudulent
concealment and then demonstrating that given the defendant's
actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the
claim earlier." Id. The medical malpractice statute of
limitations, with its discovery rule and that rule's fraudulent
concealment doctrine, applies to every "malpractice action
against a health care provider." As noted above, the statute
defines "malpractice action against a health care provider" to
include actions for wrongful death "based upon alleged personal
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or
which should have been rendered by the health care provider."
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Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-3(14). Thus, the medical malpractice
act's two-year statute of limitations applies to cases of
fraudulent concealment arising out of medical malpractice.
In contrast, the three-year fraud statute of
limitations, section 78-12-26, applies to any action "for relief
on the ground of fraud." The fraud statute of limitations is
thus far broader than the medical malpractice act, and our rules
of statutory construction provide that the more specific medical
malpractice act applies instead of the more general fraud statute
of limitations.
Shelly's family argues that it has made a general fraud
claim and a constructive fraud claim in addition to, and distinct
from, their claims of fraudulent concealment discussed above.
However, we can find nothing in their allegation of fraud or
constructive fraud that is in any way different from their claims
of fraudulent concealment. All the allegations raised by
Shelly's family surround their claim that Dr. Healy acted to
divert the family's attention away from his alleged malpractice
when he had a duty to disclose the facts of his relationship with
attorneys Healy and Sharp. The only damages arising out of
Shelly's family's claims for fraud and constructive fraud relate
to the possibility that they were prevented from discovering the
facts constituting their claim for medical malpractice. While we
acknowledge that there may be cases where a doctor commits fraud
on a patient in a way that would not be covered by the medical
malpractice act's fraudulent concealment provision, this is not
such a case. Given the specific facts alleged in this case, we
cannot agree that Shelly's family's fraud claim amounts to
anything more than or is different from a claim of fraudulent
concealment of medical malpractice.6 See Gillman v. Department

6

Shelly's family claims that this reading of the statutes
would violate their right to uniform operation of laws under
article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. They argue that,
read as outlined above, the medical malpractice statute creates
two classes of people, those defrauded by health care providers
and those defrauded by others, and provides a shorter statute of
limitations for the former than for the latter. We decline to
address this issue as it is inadequately researched and briefed.
See Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996);
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 234 (Utah 1995); State v. Wareham,
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc.
v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1079 (Utah 1988);
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
(Footnote continued on the next page.)
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of Fin, Inst./ 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989) (rejecting
attempts to recast claim for damages arising out of regulators'
licensing decision as claim for negligence to avoid governmental
immunity).
In conclusion, we hold that Shelly's family's wrongful
death claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations
for medical malpractice actions contained in section 78-14-4 of
the Utah Code, We further conclude that the limitations period
starts running when the patient or plaintiff discovers, or
through the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the
underlying injury and its origins in medical malpractice. We
remand this case for a factual finding as to whether Shelly's
family's claims of fraudulent concealment will toll the statute
of limitations as to their wrongful death and survival claims.
We hold that the deceased's children were not entitled to bring a
wrongful death claim because their mother had a guardian
appointed at the time of her death and thus the children were not
entitled to the provisions of the tolling statute. Finally, we
hold that Shelly's family's claims for common law fraud are also
governed by the two-year medical malpractice statute of
limitations found in section 78-14-4 and decline to reach their
claims of the unconstitutionality of this reading of the statute.

Justice Russon, Justice Howe, Judge Eves, and Judge
Halliday concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's opinion.
Having disqualified themselves, Associate Chief Justice
Stewart and Justice Durham do not participate herein; District
Judge J. Philip Eves and District Judge Bruce K. Halliday sat.

6

(Footnote continued.)
As we recently noted in Monson v. Carver, we may refuse to
address a claim of unconstitutionality where the party making the
claim has failed to make the requisite showing to support the
claim. 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). *MA] reviewing court
is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'"
Id. (quoting Butler, 909 P.2d at 230-31) (additional citations
omitted). In this case, as in Monson, we are particularly loath
to address a claim of unconstitutionality of a statute where the
outcome would "'critically depend on factual research" into the
effectiveness of these differing statutes of limitations in
furthering the legislature's purported goals.
No. 950164
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REMITTITUR
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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On Petition for Rehearing
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
This court now grants rehearing and issues this opinion
without hearing oral argument. We address whether we should
uphold summary judgment in favor of defendant McKay-Dee Hospital
("McKay-Dee") because plaintiffs Shayne Hipwell and Sherry
Jensen's wrongful death action against McKay-Dee was barred by
the medical malpractice statute of limitations. See Utah Code

Ann. § 78-14-4. In our prior opinion in this case, we reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to all defendants
and remanded on the issue of whether defendant Michael J. Healy's
(uDr. Healy") alleged fraud in collaborating with plaintiffs'
original attorney was sufficient to toll the statute of
limitations on their medical malpractice claims once they had
retained an independent attorney. Jensen v. IHC Hosps. , Inc. ,
314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29 (Apr. 4, 1997). We further held that
Jensen and Hipwell's attempt to recharacterize their medical
malpractice wrongful death claim as a claim for fraud was not
sufficient to avoid the two-year medical malpractice statute of
limitations. Id. at 30. In its petition for rehearing, McKayDee now claims that summary judgment in its favor should have
been upheld because (i) Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the
statute of limitations as to Jensen and Hipwell's claims against
McKay-Dee; and (ii) Jensen and Hipwell's allegations of fraud on
the part of McKay-Dee were properly dismissed by the trial court.
We begin with a brief review of the facts relevant to
our decision on rehearing. Because we are reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving parties, Jensen and Hipwell. Id. at 25. Jensen
and Hipwell allege that Dr. Healy, who had staff privileges at
McKay-Dee but was not employed by McKay-Dee, committed
malpractice on Shelly Hipwell (Jensen's daughter and Hipwell's
wife) while she was a patient at McKay-Dee. They claim that, to
cover his alleged malpractice, he and a McKay-Dee doctor
fraudulently transferred Shelly to University Hospital. Jensen
and Hipwell further allege that Dr. Healy then colluded with his
brother, attorney Tim Healy, and attorney Roger Sharp to prevent
Jensen and Hipwell from learning of the malpractice Dr. Healy had
allegedly committed. Jensen and Hipwell made no allegation that
McKay-Dee knew about Dr. Healy's collusion with his brother and
attorney Sharp.
In our prior opinion, we held that Jensen and Hipwell's
allegations of fraud against Dr. Healy were sufficient to toll
the statute of limitations on their claims as long as they
retained attorney Sharp. Id. at 28. However, we remanded to the
trial court on the issue of whether Dr. Healy's alleged fraud was
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations after Jensen and
Hipwell retained independent counsel but before that counsel had
actual knowledge of the facts constituting Dr. Healy's alleged
fraud. Id. at 2 8-29. The issues we now address are (i) whether
Dr. Healy's alleged fraud can also act to toll the statute of
limitations as to McKay-Dee; and (ii) whether Jensen and
Hipwell's allegations of fraud on the part of McKay-Dee are
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee.
These issues were not discussed in our initial opinion.
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As to the first issue, whether Dr. Healy's fraudulent
collusion with Jensen and Hipwell's original attorney can toll
the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee, the general rule is
that fraud committed by a third party in concealing a cause of
action against another defendant will not toll the statute of
limitations as to that defendant. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 150 (1970) . Where, however, there is an agency or
privity relationship between the third party committing the fraud
and the defendant, our cases indicate that liability for the
agent's negligent or intentional tort can be imputed to the
principal if the agent acts in whole or in part to carry out the
purposes of the principal. See Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811
P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d
1053, 1057 (Utah 1989) .x On the record before us, we cannot
determine whether Dr. Healy's fraud in colluding with attorney
Sharp and attorney Healy should be imputed to McKay-Dee absent
two factual findings: (i) that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's agent;
and (ii) that Dr. Healy acted in whole or in part to further the
aims of McKay-Dee. The complaint makes no allegations regarding
these issues. We remand to the trial court for further
proceedings.
If the trial court finds that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's
agent and that he acted at least in part to further McKay-Dee's
aims, it should impute liability for Dr. Healy's fraud to McKayDee and toll the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee to the
same extent it is tolled as to Dr. Healy.2 If, on the other
hand, the trial court finds either that Dr. Healy was not McKayDee's agent or that Dr. Healy acted "entirely on personal motives
unrelated to [McKay-Dee's] interests," Hodges, 811 P.2d at 157,
then Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the statute of limitations

1

The cases cited also include two other factors to consider
in determining whether an agent's conduct will be imputed to the
principal in the employment context: (i) whether the employee's
conduct is of the general kind the employee is expected to
perform; and (ii) whether the employee's conduct occurred within
the hours of the employee's work and ordinary spatial boundaries.
Hodges. 811 P.2d at 156; Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1056-57. As
Dr. Healy was not McKay-Dee's employee, these criteria would not
seem to apply to the question of whether Dr. Healy's acts fall
within the scope of any agency relationship he may have had with
McKay-Dee.
2

We note, however, that this issue will be moot if the fact
finder determines, pursuant to our prior opinion, that Jensen and
Hipwell's complaint was not timely filed because Dr. Healy's
fraud did not toll the statute of limitations long enough. See
Jensen, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29.
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as to McKay-Dee and Jensen and Hipwell's claims against McKay-Dee
are barred.
Moving to the second issue raised on rehearing, Jensen
and Hipwell argue that the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee
should be tolled because of fraud allegedly committed by McKayDee, through one of its doctors, in participating in an allegedly
fraudulent transfer of Shelly Hipwell from McKay-Dee to
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell did not originally argue
that McKay-Dee had committed fraud that would toll the statute of
limitations. Their complaint did, however, include a count of
constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. The trial court held first
that the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section
78-14-4 of the Code, barred Jensen and Hipwell's claim of
constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. In the alternative, the
trial court ruled that the claim was "unsupported by the facts"
and that there was "insufficient evidence to submit this matter
to a jury as the fact finder." In our original opinion, we
upheld the trial court's finding that Jensen and Hipwell's claim
for constructive fraud amounted to nothing more than a claim for
medical malpractice, which would be barred by the medical
malpractice statute of limitations. Jensen, 314 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 30. We did not address, however, the contention that Jensen
and Hipwell's allegations of constructive fraud on the part of
McKay-Dee would be sufficient to toll the statute of limitations
on Jensen and Hipwell's medical malpractice claims against McKayDee. We find that the trial court properly granted summary
judgment to McKay-Dee, ruling that Jensen and Hipwell's
constructive fraud claim was insufficiently supported by the
evidence and therefore could not be used to toll the statute of
limitations.
Addressing the merits of this claim requires a careful
analysis of the relative burdens of proof and production involved
in making and opposing a motion for summary judgment. As noted
above, when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we view all
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at
25. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the
burden of proof for its motion, namely, the burden of proving
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
However, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
still has the ultimate burden of proving all the elements of his
or her cause of action. Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874
P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994) . Further, once challenged, the party
who opposes such a motion must come forward with sufficient proof
to support his or her claim, particularly when that party has had
an opportunity to conduct discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) . The party opposing a properly
supported motion for summary judgment umay not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his [or her] pleading, but his [or her]
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response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Put
another way, once the moving party has brought forth evidence
either tending to prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact
or challenging the existence of one of the elements of the cause
of action, the nonmoving party then bears the burden of
u
provid[ing] some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support
of the essential elements of his [or her] claim." Thayne, 874
P.2d at 124.
In this case, Jensen and Hipwell failed to provide any
such evidence to support their claim of constructive fraud.
Constructive fraud requires two elements: (i) a confidential
relationship between the parties; and (ii) a failure to disclose
material facts. See Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301-02
(Utah 1978); 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§ 4, 15 (1968).
Jensen and Hipwell's complaint alleges both (i) that McKay-Dee's
employee, Dr. Baughman, had a confidential relationship with
Shelly and her family as one of her treating physicians, and
(ii) that Dr. Baughman failed to disclose that he had committed
medical malpractice in treating Shelly. McKay-Dee's motion for
summary judgment did not challenge Jensen and Hipwell's assertion
that Dr. Baughman had a confidential relationship with Shelly and
her family. McKay-Dee's motion, however, did dispute Jensen and
Hipwell's allegation that Dr. Baughman failed to disclose his
alleged malpractice. McKay-Dee produced the deposition of
Dr. Baughman, wherein he states, U I have no question at all that
[Shelly] received care that's exemplary, that could be used as an
example of the management of a good operation." Dr. Baughman
further indicated that he held that belief at the time he
provided Shelly's care. McKay-Dee properly challenged Jensen and
Hipwell's allegation that Dr. Baughman had failed to discharge
his duty to disclose material facts to them, namely, the fact
that he had committed malpractice, by producing Dr. Baughman's
deposition in which he states that he did not believe and does
not believe that he committed malpractice.
Jensen and Hipwell, however, as the nonmoving parties,
utterly failed to meet their burden of coming forward with
evidence to contradict Dr. Baughman's deposition testimony. In
their opposition to McKay-Dee's motion for summary judgment,
Jensen and Hipwell simply reiterate the allegations of their
complaint and provide no support for their claim that
Dr. Baughman failed to tell them that Shelly had been "left to
bleed internally for several hours before accurately diagnosing
her illness." Dr. Baughman's deposition testimony specifically
and directly challenges Jensen and Hipwell's assertion, and they
failed to provide any evidence to support their claim. Thus, the
trial court correctly ruled that there was insufficient evidence
to submit the matter to a jury. Because Jensen and Hipwell's
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claim of constructive fraud against McKay-Dee was insufficiently
supported by the evidence, such a claim cannot be used to toll
the statute of limitations on their medical malpractice claims
against McKay-Dee.
We remand to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Justice Howe, Justice Russon, Judge Eves, and Judge
Halliday concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's opinion.
Having disqualified themselves, Associate Chief Justice
Stewart and Justice Durham do not participate herein; District
Judge J. Philip Eves and District Judge Bruce K. Halliday sat.
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